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is permitted to assume the electronic signature is that of 
the sender. In this instance, the recipient is under a duty 
to carry out such procedures.
  Should the sender dispute they sent the electronic message 
with the electronic signature attached, it will be for the 
sender to demonstrate that they did not send the message.
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BACKGROUND
The most significant development in litigation in Canada in the past decade is the emergence of class actions. To understand the introduction of class 
actions into Canada, and their rapid growth, one needs to 
appreciate a basic fact   the high cost of litigation and its 
negative impact on access to justice. As in England, the 
cost of litigation in Canada is very high, and its impact is 
much exacerbated by the risks resulting from the loser pay 
rule (which is not ameliorated in Canada by "before the 
event" or "after the event" insurance). With the virtual 
disappearance of civil legal aid (except in family law) the 
result is that for the average, risk averse citizen, litigation 
is more or less out of the question unless the individual's
damages are very large, liability is reasonably clear, and a 
lawyer is willing to underwrite the cost of the litigation (on 
a no win, no pay basis).
Also, in Canada motor vehicle and industrial accident 
litigation do not play the central role that they do in the 
English litigation system. As far as industrial accidents are 
concerned, no fault workers' compensation schemes have 
replaced common law actions across Canada since the 1930s. 
Since the 1980s, motor vehicle injury cases have been dealt 
with by no fault schemes in almost two thirds of the country 
(Ontario and Quebec) unless a claimants' injuries are "serious 
and permanent". The relevance of all this is that it makes 
litigation lawyers hungry for product lines. Before the 
introduction of class actions, we had little or no mass tort
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litigation (e.g. product liability litigation): indeed, we had very 
little of the types of litigation that have been the subject of the 
more than 400 class actions commenced since they were 
introduced in common law Canada in 1993. The situation in 
Canada is quite different to that in the US, where large 
damages awards for pain and suffering and the absence of fee 
shifting has led to a vast amount of mass tort/ product liability 
litigation (both individual and class actions), best exemplified 
by the asbestos litigation.J o
DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
CLASS ACTIONS
A class action is one in which a representative plaintiff 
sues on behalf of a defined class of claimants whose claims 
raise a common issue of fact or law. Class actions grew out 
of the old representative action, which became encrusted 
with restrictive limitations imposed by case law both in 
Canada and the UK   particularly in cases where the 
claims made were for monetary damages. In the late 
1970s Canadian lawyers attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
mount American style class actions using the 
representative action rule. In the case of General Motors oj 
Canada Ltd v Naken in 1983 (involving claims for damages 
for misrepresentation in the sale of an alleged "lemon" 
motor car), the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that 
the representative action rule would not support or 
permit such an action because there were too many issues 
raised by this type of action which were not addressed by 
the representative action rule (eg notice to class members, 
what costs regime should apply, who should be subject to 
discovery, and how damages should be assessed). The SCC 
held that whether there should be class actions and what 
should be the applicable rules was a matter best left to be 
resolved and provided for by the provincial legislatures.
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE AND THE 
PARTING OF THE WAYS BETWEEN UK AND 
CANADA
The legislatures responded to the situation. Quebec did 
so very early, passing a class action statute in 1978. 
Ontario also did so, but not until 1993, and British 
Columbia followed in 1995. However, it was only with the 
passage of the Ontario and British Columbia Acts that 
class actions really took off, even in Quebec.
The three policy underpinnings
The threefold rationale for class actions was spelt out in 
the Ontario Law Reform Commission's massive 1982 
Report on Class Actions:
  Access to justice: it is an important benefit of class 
actions that they divide fixed litigation costs over the 
entire class, making it economically feasible to prosecute 
claims that might otherwise not be brought at all.
  Judicial efficiency: Class actions avoid the duplication of 
fact-finding and legal analvsis, and the risk of
o o j '
inconsistent decisions, inherent in multiple individual 
law suits.
  Behaviour modification: where manufactures, etc can 
inflict small amounts of damage on large numbers of 
people wrho cannot afford to litigate individually, the 
deterrent function of the underlying law (e.g tort law) is 
lost. By subjecting such defendants to the risk of a class 
action it is hoped that their behaviour can be modified.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CLASS ACTION 
PROCEDURE
A class action is brought by a named representative 
plaintiff on behalf of a defined class. If the action passes 
the tests for certification (see below) it proceeds as a class 
action, in which case issues common to the class are 
decided at a "common issues hearing" and then if there
o
remain individual issues (e.g. individual damage 
assessments) these are decided at individual hearings. The 
plaintiff class action lawyer is remunerated by a court 
ordered fee typically paid out of the "common fund" 
produced by the litigation. Any settlement must be 
approved by the court to be binding on the class. The class 
action device is purely procedural. It in no way changes 
substantive law, and the litigation is conducted according 
to the substantive law principles applicable to individual 
actions such as negligence, contract, fraud,
o o '
misrepresentation, etc.
In order to proceed as a class action it must be certified 
as such: in effect leave of the court is required for it to 
proceed as a class action. The essential (and quite 
minimal) requirements are:
  The pleadings must disclose a cause of action;
  The claims of the class members must raise common 
issues;
  A class proceeding would be the preferable procedure 
for resolution of the common issues.
  There are also the requirements of adequate class 
definition, and that the representative plaintiff be an 
adequate representative without a conflict of interest 
with other class members.
Canadian certification requirements are less demanding 
than the US, which has further criteria including that
' o
common questions must predominate over individual 
issues, and that a class action must be superior to other 
possible procedures. If certified, the action proceeds as a 
class action; if certification is denied it is the end of the 
proceeding as a class action.
Notice must then be given to class members of the class 
action, its nature and how the class is defined (this can be, 
and often is, by newspaper advertising). Class members 
then have the right to opt out; if they do not they are 
bound by the decision in the action whether favourable or 
unfavourable. Both Canada and the US follow a "lawyer 27
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entrepreneur" model; the expectation is that lawyers will 
pursue class actions on a "no win/no fee" basis in the hope 
of court awarded fees if they are successful. This is the 
"oil" that makes the system run.
WHICH JURISDICTIONS HAVE CLASS 
ACTIONS?
The US has class actions in the federal courts and in 
virtually every state, while in Australia they are permitted in 
the federal court and in Victoria. In Canada, Quebec, 
Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland 
and the Federal Court have class actions. Class action 
legislation has also been proposed in Manitoba and Alberta. 
In fact, Canada now has class actions in every province after 
the recent SCC decision in Western Canadian Shopping Centres 
in which the court effectively overruled its old decision in 
General Motors of Canada Ltd v Naken (above). The court held 
that in the absence of comprehensive legislation, the courts 
must fill the void under their inherent power to settle the 
rules of practice and procedure as to disputes brought 
before them, and that class actions should be allowed to 
proceed under general representative action rules. The 
court emphasized the importance of class actions as a 
procedural tool in modern litigation to bring about access 
to justice and relied upon the class action legislation in 
Ontario and British Columbia for guidance as to the 
appropriate procedure to be followed. The court's 
extraordinary decision underlines how far class actions 
have come in Canada in a short time and their perceived 
important role in providing access to justice.
THE CANADIAN CASE LAW EXPERIENCE
Class actions in Canada have had great success. They 
have provided access to justice and compensation to 
hundreds of thousands of people who, in the absence of 
such actions, would likely never have sued and therefore 
would have received nothing. There have been
o
approximately 400 class actions since 1993. This figure 
represents the total number of actions commenced, and 
not all were certified or successful. The actions referred to 
below were all successful (in that they resulted in 
settlements compensating the class). The types of cases 
have varied, but the examples given in the following 
groupings give some flavour of what is happening.
Torts: product liability/consumer protection
  defective household dryers
  defective plastic furnace venting systems
  defective toilets.
Torts: Product Liability — Personal Injury
• silicon gel breast implants; o r '
  defective heart pacemakers (Nantais);
• tainted blood (blood products contaminated with
hepatitis C);  
  claims in respect of prescription weight loss drugs.
Mass Torts
  railway accidents (action on behalf of persons injured in 
subway and railway collisions);
  damages arising from a fire in a subway system;
  water pollution (e coli in a town water supply);
  clinical negligence (patients who had received EEG tests 
at five clinics run by the
  defendant doctor and contracted hepatitis B);
  release of toxic gases from an industrial plant.
Contract
• pension and benefits cases (including entitlement to 
pension plan surplus; action by a class of beneficiaries to 
determine pension entitlements; claim by retired 
employees regarding withdrawal of promised health care 
benefits; claims by members of an employee pension 
plan alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the actuary for 
the pension plan);
  "vanishing premiums" life insurance cases;
  illegal interest charges;
  mass wrongful dismissals;o 7
  solicitor's negligence (class action brought against a 
solicitor for negligence arising out of a syndicated 
mortgages scheme where a rogue had converted the 
invested funds for his own use; an action against the 
rogue proved fruitless and hence the action against the 
solicitor);
  misrepresentations concerning a golf course housing 
development
  defectively constructed condominiums.
Financial markets
• misrepresentation re sales of shares in both the primary 
and secondary markets.
Competition Law
  price fixingI o
Miscellaneous
  native land claims;
  copyright infringement
RECOVERIES, SETTLEMENTS AND FEE 
AWARDS
Settlements must be approved by the court and must be 
"fair and reasonable" (see below). In making fee awards
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(which are made by the court) Canadian courts have 
shown more restraint than US courts, but fees can still be 
very substantial. Expressed as a percentage of the damages 
recovered, fee awards in Canada mostly range from 15 per 
cent   26 per cent, but fees awards have been as low as 2.4 
per cent, and as high as 60 per cent. A higher percentage 
fee is usually justified where the recovery is relatively low.
The amount of the fees that will be awarded can be hard 
to predict because all the factors to be taken into account 
are not yet clear. Moreover, there are two competing 
methods in use:
(i) Multipier method: base fee (hours worked x hourly 
rate) x multipier (to reward risk taking):
(ii) Percentage of recovery to reflect all elements of the 
litigation
However, the Ontario Court of Appeal has recognized 
that the legislative objective of enhanced access to justice 
requires that solicitors conducting class proceedings have a 
real opportunity to obtain a multiple of the base fee, the 
multiplier should generally be in the range of one to four 
and fees awarded must be appropriate to make the system 
run and attract lawyers to take the necessary risks
EXAMPLES OF SETTLEMENTS AND FEES 
AWARDED
In one silicone gel breast implants action there was a 
settlement of $29 million, with a counsel fee of 
approximately $2 million dollars awarded. (There have 
been several breast implant cases; total settlements on 
behalf of Quebec and Ontario claimants alone amounted to 
$75,000.000, and there have been additional actions in 
British Columbia). In another case invoking defective heart 
pacemakers, a settlement of $23.1 million was reached 
with the f ,005 class members sharing approximately $16.8 
million. A total of $6.3 million in fees and disbursements 
was awarded. There have been numerous "vanishing 
premiums" life insurance policy cases. In one such case the 
settlement was for $65 million with an award of $3 million 
in fees. In another such action the total settlement recovery 
was $240 million, and the fee award was $6.5 million 
(approximately 2.7 per cent of the amount recovered).
In the Hepatitis C tainted blood litigation, the global 
amount of the settlement was $1.5 billion. Fees totalingo
about $52.5 million were approved in Ontario and British 
Columbia actions, ranging from 2.36 per cent to 4.26 per 
cent of the recovery of the class depending on whether the 
actions were brought in Ontario or British Colombia, ando '
whether it was the transfused action or the hemophiliac 
action. ^
HOW CLASS ACTION LITIGATION IS 
CONDUCTED
Typically class actions are hard fought. Much procedural 
battling takes place over certification, and there are
frequent pre certification motions by defendants in an 
attempt to get rid of the case or wear the plaintiffs down. 
However, in some cases settlement comes quite early 
(before certification); this can often be for business 
reasons, or where governments are parties, political 
reasons. It is quite common for certification to lead to 
settlement. Few cases have proceeded to trial; most settle, 
as with individual litigation, and probably at about the 
same rate. There is a whole jurisprudence on certification. 
Courts have been somewhat disingenuous and have usedo
the "preferable procedure" requirement to give 
themselves a discretion and the ultimate power to say 
which class actions will be allowed to proceed (and this 
often seems to be exercised subjectively). A particular 
problem is posed by cases involving oral 
misrepresentations, where it can be difficult to find a 
"common question". A small number of plaintiff specialist 
firms have emerged. Defence work tends to be in the 
hands of the elite corporate law firms, who have generally 
eschewed plaintiff's work   essentially because their major 
clients, corporations, are typically defendants and it is 
perceived they would not like to see their law firm acting 
for "the enemy".
TWO AREAS OF DIFFICULTY: COSTS AND 
FUNDING
Costs regime
The traditional "loser pays" costs rules do not work at 
all well with class actions. The rule that normally the 
winner should pay the loser's costs   "fee-shifting", or the 
"English costs rule" as the Americans call it   is generally
o o -
not followed in the US. However, it is the normal rule in 
the Commonwealth countries of Canada and Australia, so 
fee-shifting has not been a problem for the US, but has 
been for Canada and Australia.
The first thing a Commonwealth class action regime 
must resolve is whether class members other than the 
representative plaintiff may be liable for the defendant's 
costs. This has been resolved legislatively so that they are 
never liable regarding the "common issues" part of the 
proceeding (since they are, in a sense, involuntary 
litigants), though they can be liable for costs on the 
adjudication of individual issues (e.y. the assessment of 
their personal damages).
But a troublesome point remains: should the 
representative plaintiff be individually liable for the 
defendant's costs if the action is unsuccessful? On this 
issue the recommendation made by the Ontario Eaw 
Reform Commission's Report on Class Actions in 1982 was 
succinct - generally the representative plaintiff should not 
be liable for costs, and should only be made liable in 
special circumstances (e.g. if the litigation plaintiff was 
found to be vexatious). The reason for the 
recommendation was stated clearly: if the rule were 
otherwise why would anyone agree to become the 29
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representative plaintiff? If the class action is successful the 
representative plaintiff will never recover more than her 
claim/share (which may be quite small, e.g. $5,000) yet by 
acting as the representative plaintiff under a loser pay 
regime she would assume the full costs of a multi-million 
dollar class action if the action fails.
But the Ontario legislation as enacted ignored this 
recommendation and provided instead for a general loser 
pays costs regime, with a discretion in the court to relieve 
a losing plaintiff of liability for costs where the class 
proceeding "was a test case, raised a novel point of law or 
involved a matter of public interest". However, British 
Columbia adopted the OLRC proposal so in that province 
there is a general rule against loser pays costs with some 
minor exceptions: costs may only be awarded in a class 
action: if there has been vexatious, frivolous or abusive 
conduct on the part of any party.
Notwithstanding Ontario's retention of fee-shifting, 
and the OLRC's dire prediction, class actions have thrived 
in the Province and there has been no shortage of 
representative plaintiffs. Presumably this is because 
plaintiffs' lawyers are choosing judgment-proof 
representatives or are expressly or impliedly agreeing to 
indemnify the representative for any adverse cost award. 
[Individual class members are, naturally, liable for the cost 
of pursing individual claim (i.e. quantification of individual
damages), and at that stage of the proceeding the losero ' ' o r o
pays principle applies.]
FUNDING
The funding of the plaintiff side of class actions was 
given little attention by those who designed the Canadian 
class action regimes (with the exception of Quebec). Class 
actions are not covered by legal aid. Instead the 
entrepreneurial, bounty hunter, plaintiff class action 
counsel funds the action and chases the pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow; but the chase can be long, hard and1 o'
very expensive. There is great risk involved for lawyers 
acting on a no-win/no-pay basis in class actions which are 
frequently complex and expensive; when the stakes are 
high the defendants often fight very hard with full 
knowledge of the financial weakness of the plaintiff class 
counsel. As a result, interim funding problems for the' or
plaintiff lawyer are daunting.
Ontario has a class proceedings fund that provides 
disbursement funding but does not cover lawyers' fees. Its 
primary purpose is to guard the representative plaintiff from 
an adverse costs award   if any financial support is given to 
a plaintiff, the fund becomes liable for any cost order against 
the plaintiff and the plaintiff is relieved of all liability for such 
costs. The fund is financed by a 10 per cent levy on any 
recovery in funded actions. But the Ontario fund has not 
worked very well. Only a small percentage of class action 
plaintiffs have applied for funding, few cases have been 
granted funding and the "big settlement cases" have typically
not applied so the fund has lacked funding.
The situation is better in Quebec. It also has a fund   
known as the Fonds   which does provide lawyer fee (and 
disbursement) funding, financed out of a 10 per cent levy 
or charge on any judgments received in cases that funded 
by the Fonds. It appears to have much higher usage rate 
than the Ontario fund.
CLASS ACTION PROBLEMS
Although class actions in Canada have had great success 
and provided access to justice, and compensation, to 
hundreds of thousands of people who would otherwise 
never have received anything, class actions are not problem 
free. Most of the problems I am about to discuss are well 
documented in the US. However, they are at least 
potential problems in Canada as well, and while we are 
perhaps doing better than our US counterparts, I do not 
believe we are yet taking the problems seriously enough.
The "clientless" lawyer
Many of the problems stem from the fact that the class 
action lawyer is, effectively "client-less" and this gives rise 
to agency7 problems. The lawyer is client-less in the sense 
that often the lawyer will have chosen the class 
representative and, in any event, once the class action is 
certified his client is the whole class, not just the named 
representative plaintiff. There is no one to give the lawyer 
binding instructions and effectively the class action is the 
lawyer's action, not that of the class or the representative 
plaintiff. The overarching feature of class actions is that the 
principals (the class members) cannot effectively monitor 
their agent (die class lawyer), so the monitoring role 
ordinarily played by clients in non-class actions is absent in 
class actions. This is further reinforced by the fact that the 
lawyer will typically have (i) invented or devised the class 
action, and (ii) he or she will be funding the action 
personally through his or her firm.
Settlements and the risks of conflict of interest and 
collusion
These agency problems are most apparent in the 
settlement of class actions. Like most other cases, most 
class actions settle. Unlike most settlements, class action 
settlements raise very serious questions. The settlement of 
class actions differs from other chil suits in an important 
respect. In an ordinary (non-class) action, any settlement 
reached between the parties will be binding only upon 
them; accordinglv, the settlement will be legitimate so long
' o J' o o
as the named parties consent to it. By contrast, in a class 
action any settlement will affect the rights of everyone 
\\ithin the defined class, without the explicit consent of 
individual class members. Hence, to protect these absent 
class members from being bound by unfair settlements, 
under our legislation class actions may be settled only with 
court approval.
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A further problem with class action settlements is the 
conflict of interest inherent in the process and the 
opportunity for collusion between plaintiff 's counsel and 
the defendant. The Ontario Law Reform Commission was 
well aware of this, and in its Report on Class Actions the 
issue is discussed in terms which have been repeated by 
subsequent US commentators. The OLRC noted that:
"There is a real possibility that, without the benefit of 
appropriate safeguards, parties and their counsel might be 
tempted to abuse the class action procedure in reaching a 
settlement. For example, the representative plaintiff might use 
the class action to enhance his individual bargaining position, 
or class members' interests could be sacrificed Jor lawyers'fees 
... Moreover, in the context of a settlement negotiated on 
behalf of the entire class, the agreement reached could be 
inadequate or unfair to the class members "[I]t has also been 
suggested that the interests of the class lawyer and the class 
members might diverge; this would occur where the lawyer 
negotiates a settlement that maximizes the lawyer's 
compensation at the expense of the ultimate recovery achieved 
Jor class members. The most obvious manner in which such a 
result might occur is where the defendant offers to absorb the 
fees of the class la\yyer, calculated at a premium rate, in return 
for the acceptance of an inadequate class award and 
discontinuance of the class action. Such a result might also 
occur, however, through indirect Jinancial pressures, without 
any conscious misbehaviour on the part of the lawyer. "
This phenomenon is not peculiar to class actions and 
can be present in ordinary PI litigation where lawyers 
simultaneously negotiate both damages and costs. For 
example, D proposes a settlement of $50,000 for damages 
and $5000 for costs. P says that he could not recommend 
that to his client. D responds with an offer of $45,000 for 
damages and $10,000 for costs, and the plaintiff says that 
would be acceptable. But in non-class actions we see client 
monitoring as the answer; the individual client can accept 
or reject the proposed settlement.
Little or nothing has changed since the OLRC wrote its 
1982 Report. Recently, Professor John Coffee stated the 
problem in similar terms:
"Collusion within the class action context essentially requires an 
agreement — actual or implicit — by which the defendants receive 
a "cheaper" than arm's length settlement and the plaintiffs' 
attorneys receive in somejbrm an above-market attorneys'fee. In 
return for this ... settlement, defendants either pay the plaintiffs' 
attorneys'fees themselves or agree not to contest the plaintiffs' 
attorneys' application for court-awarded fees... "
And Judge Richard Posner makes the same point:
"The lawyer for the class will be tempted to offer to settle with 
the defendant for a small judgment and a large legal fee, and 
such an offer will he attractive to the defendant, provided the 
sum of the two figures is less than the defendant's net 
expected loss from going to trial".
The OLRC, having anticipated these problems under a
new class action regime, recommended judicial scrutiny 
(court monitoring in place of client monitoring) as the 
solution and the requirement that class action settlements 
be subject to court approval has been incorporated into 
class proceedings legislation. But is this "remedy" 
sufficient, and in applying it what limitations exist? And 
most importantly, can this "remedy" be improved? I 
believe the real issue here is inability of a common law, 
adversary system judges to adequately conduct inquisitorial 
fairness hearings regarding settlement without the aid of
o o o
counsel to oppose the settlement. At the fairness hearing a 
judge is faced with two counsel who are both claiming that 
this settlement is a good thing i.e. fair and reasonable for
o o
the class members. Unlike the usual situation in an 
adversary hearing, the judge is deprived of adversarial 
presentation. I have suggested on several occasions that 
judges should appoint counsel to oppose the settlement, 
but no court has done so to date. I am of the view that if 
defendants are willing to throw $10 million or a billion
o
dollars at a case to settle it, then the case can afford the cost 
of paying a counsel to oppose the settlement or at least 
independently advise the court as to the reasonableness or 
otherwise ot the settlement. Our judges have taken some 
steps towards assuring the reasonableness of settlements. 
There is a principle (not clearly and universally recognized) 
that the parties should not simultaneously negotiate 
damages and fees. I would go further and adopt a principle 
that the defendant should have no say in the plaintiffs 
lawyer's compensation in a common fund case at all. The 
court can just let the plaintiff's counsel make his/her pitch 
to the judge as to what should be awarded as counsel fees: 
the defendant should not be allowed to take part in, or 
make representations at, the fairness hearing otherwise this 
becomes a trading point between the parties (e.g., P agrees 
to settle for $3M is D agrees to support P's request for a 
$1M fee.) We have had two cases in which judges have 
refused to approve settlements until they were improved 
(two tainted blood cases). In another case the court refused 
outright to approve a settlement of a corporate "strike suit" 
where counsel had entered an agreement for a dismissal of 
the action with the defendant paying the plaintiff counsel's 
fees. (The lack of adversarial presentation becomes even 
more acute at hearings to fix counsel fees. Here we have the 
somewhat ludicrous scene of the supposed counsel for the 
class standing up unopposed and asking to have a sizeable 
portion of the classes' money given to him as a counsel fee.)
ARE CLASS ACTIONS FAIR TO PLAINTIFFS 
AND DEFENDANTS?
A study in 2000 by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice 
observed:
"Plaintiff attorneys can be motivated by the prospect of 
substantial fees for relatively little effort. For their part, 
defendants may want to settle early and inexpensively. When 
these incentives intersect, the settlements reached may send 
inappropriate deterrence signals, waste resources, and 31
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encourage future frivolous litigation ".
The study observed that its data did not provide a basis 
for estimating the proportion of litigation in which 
questionable practices obtain. (Hensler, D.R.et al., Class 
Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain, Santa 
Monica: Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 2000 The full text 
of the Rand study can found at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969/).
The plaintiff's perspective
Class actions would be unfair to plaintiffs if the 
compensation achieved was inadequate and the lawyers' 
fees paid were excessive. This is not perceived to be the 
case in Canada, but the reverse may often be the case in 
the US. The Rand study concluded that the "clientless 
litigation" represented by class actions has led to 
questionable practices   settlements that are arrived at 
without adequate investigation of facts and law and that 
create little value for class members or society and class 
counsel fees disproportionate to the effort actually 
invested in the case. The plaintiffs' attorney, once seen as 
a public-regarding private attorney general, is now viewed 
as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of opportunistic 
actions and often willing to subordinate the interests ofo
class members to the attorney's own economic self- 
interest.
The defendant's perspective
Currently there is no concerted outrage from 
defendants (or their lawyers) regarding class actions in 
Canada. The Rand study indicated that class actions were 
a continuing concern to defendants in the US because of 
the alleged "blackmail" they produce (i.e. the number and 
size of the claims asserted force the defendants into 
unwarranted and excessive settlements). But Rand 
concluded that assessing this claim made by defendants 
was "enormously difficult"; defendants' complaints about 
class actions are difficult to disentangle from their 
disappointment at now being confronted with claims of a 
type and size that they previously escaped.
CONCLUSION
So what is the answer to the question posed by the 
title of this piece: do class actions really provide access 
to justice or are they just another product line for 
lawyers? The Canadian experience suggests they are 
both   a powerful tool of access to justice and a 
profitable new product line for lawyers who are 
prepared to accept the risks. But they are far from 
problem free. @
Carry D Watson QC
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